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Anyone who has watched Animal
Planet’s Animal Precinct will recognize this familiar scenario: a special
investigator from the ASPCA arrives
at a defendant’s home, discovers a
dog with an obvious medical condition, determines that the dog is not
receiving what the officer believes
to be needed medical care, seizes the
dog, takes it to the ASPCA to be treated, and arrests the owner on charges
of animal cruelty. See, e.g., People v.
Arroyo, 777 N.Y.S.2d 836, 846 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 2004). What these compelling stories do not address, however,
is the extent to which such seizures
and arrests are supported by the state
animal cruelty laws.
Not all state laws require that owners provide their animals with veterinary care. Even when they do, it is by
no means clear what level of care is
required. Another question left unanswered by these statutes is whether,
when an owner does seek care for an
animal, there are any instances where
her choices for how that animal should
be treated can be overridden.
The duty to provide veterinary
care, to the extent that it exists, can be

found in animal cruelty statutes. State
criminal laws prohibiting cruelty to
animals—which includes both abuse
and neglect—have provided the primary means in which our legal system
has protected animals. Many of these
statutes not only prohibit abusive
treatment of animals, but they also
impose affirmative duties on people
who care for animals. California, for
example, makes it a misdemeanor for
an owner to permit the animal to be
without “proper care and attention.”
Cal. Penal Code § 597f(a) (West 1999).
Another provision requires animal
depositaries to “provide the animals
with necessary and prompt veterinary care, nutrition, and shelter, and
treat them kindly.” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1834 (West Supp. 2009). While the
“treat them kindly” provision may be
unique to California, laws imposing
affirmative duties for proper housing,
veterinary care and feeding of animals
are becoming increasingly common.

Implicit vs. Explicit Duties to
Provide Veterinary Care

The affirmative duty to provide veterinary care can be explicit in the statute’s language or it can be interpreted
from more general language in the
statute. In New York, for example,
where Animal Precinct is set, there is
no explicit language that requires veterinary care. The New York Criminal
Court rejected the argument that the
affirmative duty to provide “necessary sustenance” includes veterinary
care. Arroyo, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
Some cases have, however, found
a limited duty to provide such care
within the statute’s prohibition against
an “omission or neglect” that causes or
permits “unjustifiable physical pain,
suffering or death.” See N.Y. Agric. &
Mkts. Law § 350(2) (McKinney 2004);
People v. Curcio, 874 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 2008); People v. Walsh, No.
50556(U), slip op., 2008 WL 724724

(N.Y. Crim. Ct. Jan. 3, 2008).
Animal cruelty statutes in
Maryland, the District of Columbia
and Virginia all contain explicit provisions requiring some level of veterinary care. Maryland’s law, for
example, prohibits a person with custody of an animal from “unnecessarily
fail[ing] to provide the animal with
... necessary veterinary care ... .” Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-604(a)
(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). The
District’s law contains nearly identical language, though it omits the
second “necessary.” See D.C. Code §
22-1001(a)(1) (Supp. 2009).
Virginia’s law varies in two ways:
it does not place the affirmative duty
only on the animal’s owner or custodian, and it limits the affirmative
obligation, with an offense occurring
when “[any person] deprives any
animal of necessary food, drink, shelter or emergency veterinary treatment
... .” Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6570(A)(ii)
2008) (emphasis added). What is not
clear, however, is under what conditions veterinary care would be considered “necessary,” what constitutes
an emergency, and in all cases, what
level of care might be required. Would
an owner, for example, be required to
spend money that she might not have
on “necessary” veterinary care?

How Much Care is
Necessary?

Such lack of guidance was the subject of a recent class action suit challenging the constitutionality of DC’s
animal cruelty law. Several animal
owners joined in challenging the law
after their pets were seized, underwent veterinary treatment that the
owners considered unnecessary and
were not returned to the owners until
they agreed to pay for the treatment.
Daskalea v. Washington Humane Society,
480 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C 2007). In the
case of two of the plaintiffs, Humane

Society law enforcement officers
seized their dogs from parked cars.
According to the complaint, one
dog was “‘forcibly sterilized’” against
its owner’s will, and the other was
only returned to its owner when she
“‘agreed to pay . . . [for] unnecessary
medical treatment.’” Id. at 19 (quoting plaintiffs’ amended complaint).
A third dog, which had cancer, was
seized from the owner’s home and
was not returned until he consented
to and agreed to pay for “‘radical
treatment’” in the form of “‘major
cancer surgery.’” Id. (quoting plaintiffs’ amended complaint). In the suit,
these owners claimed that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague, that it
failed to provide sufficient procedural
safeguards and that it was enforced
arbitrarily. Id. at 18.
Addressing these and other issues
in the Humane Society’s Motion to
Dismiss, the court concluded that neither “‘ unnecessarily’” nor “‘proper’”
was so indefinite as to make the provision, “‘unnecessarily fails to provide the [animal] with proper food,
drink, . . . veterinary care, shelter, or
protection from the weather’” unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 30, 33 (quoting D.C. Code § 22-1001(a)). It did,
however, uphold the plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge, which
was based, in part, on the amount of
discretion that the statute gives to
Humane Society enforcement officers
and the statute’s failure to “‘prevent
involuntary medical treatment.’” Id.
at 31, 36. This case, which is still pending, raises fundamental questions of
how much medical care is necessary
and who gets to decide. See Daskalea
v. Washington Humane Society, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment).
Several New York cases may give
limited guidance as to what level of
care might be found “necessary.”
New York law, as noted above, does

not contain an explicit requirement
for veterinary care, and one court has
found that no such duty was implied
in the statute’s language. See People v.
Arroyo, 777 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 2004). Guided in part by “current
standards of morality with respect to
pet owners’ duty to provide medical
care for their animals,” id. at 837, the
court found that the statute’s language
prohibiting “unjustifiable physical
pain” was too vague to criminalize the
failure to provide medical care to a pet
dog with a large cancerous tumor, and
thus granted the defendant’s motion
to dismiss. Id. at 844.
The court was especially reluctant
to read such a duty into the statute
when fundamental questions, such
as how much care need be provided,
remained unanswered. In calling
on its legislature to take the lead if
there was to be a requirement to provide veterinary care, the Arroyo court
pointed to statutes in Pennsylvania
and Maryland as examples of states
where depriving an animal of veterinary care was explicitly made a crime
(though the language in neither statute answers the “how much care”
question). Id. at 845.
In contrast to Arroyo, two subsequent decisions found sufficient distinctions to conclude that the same
language, “unjustifiable physical
pain,” did imply a duty to provide
medical care, and the defendants’
motions to dismiss were denied. People
v. Walsh found that allowing a cat’s
tumor to go untreated could violate
the cruelty statute, especially where,
unlike Arroyo, there was a “pattern of
neglect.” No. 50556(U), slip op., 2008
WL 724724, at 3–4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Jan.
3, 2008). And in contrast to Arroyo,
where the court’s reluctance to imply
a duty to provide medical care was
in part based on the recognition that
some owners could not afford it, the
Walsh court suggested that owners
unable to finance needed care could

surrender the animals to the ASPCA.
Id. at 3.
Similarly, in People v. Curcio, the
defendant’s motion to dismiss was
denied where his choice not to have
his dog’s tumor treated was alleged to
have caused the dog to “suffer needlessly” in violation of the cruelty statute. 874 N.Y.S.2d 723, 731 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 2008). One of the defendant’s
arguments in this case centered on
the claim that the statute should not
be read to criminalize the failure to
provide such extensive and expensive
treatment as the ASPCA undertook
for his animal. This again raises the
fundamental question of how much
care is required. See Id. at 733.
Even among statutes that require
veterinary care, there is little guidance beyond that bare requirement.
Recent amendments to Michigan’s
statute on crimes against animals give
a bit more guidance than most state
laws by requiring that animals receive
“adequate care,” which includes “veterinary medical attention in order to
maintain an animal in a state of good
health.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§
750.50(1)(a), (2)(a) (West 2004). The
final phrase is further defined as “freedom from disease and illness, and in
a condition of proper body weight
and temperature for the age and species of the animal, unless the animal is
undergoing appropriate treatment.”
Id. § 750.50(1)(K). Even with this level
of specificity, however, there is much
room for debate. What still remains
unclear is the extent to which “appropriate treatment” can be a function of
the owner’s ability to pay.

Can Owners’ Treatment
Choices Ever Be
Overridden?

As the DC and New York cases demonstrate, owners who choose no treatment for their animals may be subject
to prosecution, especially in states like

Maryland where there is an explicit,
affirmative duty to provide veterinary
care. What is less clear, however, is
the extent to which the range of treatment options may be circumscribed by
such laws. Treatment choices, including the ultimate choice to euthanize
an animal, are sometimes made for
economic reasons.
An animal may have a treatable
condition, but if its owner cannot
afford, or chooses not to spend the
money on, the treatment, one option
might be having the animal humanely
euthanized. While these choices might
sometimes be troubling, it would be
hard to argue that they run afoul of
any state’s animal cruelty laws.
Some decisions to euthanize an
animal may, however, be so extreme
as to warrant intervention. The most
problematic reason why euthanasia
is chosen in veterinary medicine is
often dubbed “convenience euthanasia” because it occurs when the decision seems to be made purely for the
convenience of the animal’s owners.
See Clinton R. Sanders, Killing with
Kindness: Veterinary Euthanasia and the
Social Construction of Personhood, 10
Soc. F. 195 (1995). Bernard Rollin, an
ethicist at Colorado State Veterinary
School, reports that the request to
euthanize healthy animals is the most
stressful and “demoralizing part of
companion animal practice.” Bernard
E. Rollin, An Introduction to Veterinary
Medical Ethics: Theory and Cases 54 (2d
ed. 2006).
Some of the real examples of convenience euthanasia that he cites are
just horrific: “clients going on vacation and not wanting to pay boarding
fees, or clients tired of an adult dog
and wanting a puppy, or clients who
have redecorated and the dog doesn’t
match the color scheme ... .” Id. at
53–54.
Laws against animal cruelty, particularly those with provisions requiring
veterinary care, may provide some

basis for challenging such owner treatment choices. These laws already provide the place where we, as a society,
have determined that certain behavior
towards animals will not be tolerated,
and they could be used to limit these
extreme treatment choices by clarifying the provisions that require proper
veterinary care. Currently, among the
cruelty statutes that explicitly address
veterinary care, some specifically
exempt owner choices for humane
euthanasia.
For example, Nebraska’s statute
on offenses against animals requires
animal caretakers to provide “care as
is reasonably necessary for the animal’s health,” but specifically allows
“[h]umane killing . . . upon the owner’s request ... .” Neb. Rev. Stat. §§
28-1008(1), 28-1013(6) (2008). Similarly,
Alabama exempts from its cruelty
prohibitions “[a]ny owner of a dog or
cat who euthanizes the dog or cat for
humane purposes.” Ala. Code § 13A11-246(2) (LexisNexis 2005). Unlike
Nebraska’s and Alabama’s laws, statutes in Maryland, D.C. and Virginia
do not contain exemptions for owner-requested euthanasia. Maryland’s
cruelty statute does exempt from its
prohibitions “customary and normal veterinary ... practices,” Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-603(1)
(LexisNexis 2002), which may or may
not include owner-requested euthanasia.
At least one statute does contain
language that could support an argument that convenience euthanasia
violates anti-cruelty law. Delaware,
like a number of other states, requires
animal owners to provide “[p]roper
veterinary care.” Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 1325(a)(11) (2007). But, unlike
in other states, an animal owner in
Delaware is guilty of cruelty when he
“unnecessarily kills ... any animal ... .”
Id. § 1325(b)(4). The statute expands
on “unnecessarily” to include killing
“if the act is not required to terminate

an animal’s suffering, to protect the
life or property of the actor or another
person or if other means of disposing
of an animal exist which would not
impair the health or well-being of that
animal ... .” Id.
This language appears to contain a
clear prohibition of killing a healthy
animal merely for the owner’s convenience (“not required to terminate . .
. suffering”), while allowing the flexibility to make such choices to prevent
a true financial hardship (“to protect .
. . property”). The final clause, despite
the unfortunate choice of “disposing,”
can be read as encouraging owners to
find other homes for their unwanted
animals or at least to take them to a
shelter that will provide better care for
them.
The statute also contains an exception for “accepted veterinary practices.” Id. § 1325(b). While, at first, this
exception may appear to sanction the
killing of a healthy animal at the owner’s request, it more likely allows for
input from the veterinary profession—
and even for evolving standards—as
to what is deemed acceptable. If most
veterinarians, as has been reported,
truly object to performing convenience euthanasia, then the procedure
cannot easily be characterized as an
“accepted veterinary practice.” If
nothing else, such language could certainly support a veterinarian’s refusal
to comply with an owner’s request to
euthanize a healthy animal.
One argument against this interpretation is that it raises the question of
what happens to the unwanted animals. Some veterinarians reluctantly
acquiesce to owner-requested euthanasia of a healthy animal because they
cannot take on caring for the animals
that the owner no longer wants, and
they do not want to be responsible for
what may happen to these unwanted
animals. Here, again, animal cruelty
statutes’ penalty provisions provide
some useful guidance.

In Delaware, for example, violators
of the cruelty prohibitions, including
that against unnecessary killing, are
prohibited from owning or possessing an animal for five or fifteen years,
depending on whether the crime is a
felony or a misdemeanor. See Id. §§
1325(c)&(d). A number of other states’
cruelty statutes allow courts to require
the forfeiture of abused animals or
similarly prohibit future ownership
of an animal from owners who abuse
them. See, e.g., D.C. Code §§ 22-1001(a)
(2)(B), (D) (Supp. 2009).
Animals that are removed from
abusive owners can be re-homed
through shelters or animal rescue
groups. Thus, denying an owner the
choice to euthanize a healthy animal
and then finding another home for
the animal is essentially another way
of confiscating an animal to protect it
from what can be characterized as a
form of abuse: viewing that animal as
disposable property.
The Delaware statute could serve as
a model of how to use cruelty laws to
challenge the truly egregious owner
choice of euthanizing a healthy animal. The statute’s language contains
enough leeway to allow owner interests, even financial ones, to trump the
animal’s interest, while discouraging
the killing of a healthy animal when
other options exist for the animal. It
allows for veterinarians to challenge
an owner’s choices that go against
accepted practices, and it contains
provisions to protect animals from
being owned by people who would
treat them in this way. Criminalizing
behavior involving treatment choice
through cruelty statutes requires a
careful balance. Legislators drafting
these statutes need to leave room for
other options where euthanasia choices or decisions not to treat ought to be
left to the owner’s discretion or may
be based on their inability to pay for
treatment.

